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Abstract—We develop the proposal of non-systematic channel
codes on the AWGN wire-tap channel. Such coding technique,
based on scrambling, achieves high transmission security with a
small degradation of the eavesdropper’s channel with respect
to the legitimate receiver’s channel. In this paper, we show
that, by implementing scrambling and descrambling on blocks of
concatenated frames, rather than on single frames, the channel
degradation needed is further reduced. The usage of concatenated
scrambling allows to achieve security also when both receivers
experience the same channel quality. However, in this case, the
introduction of an ARQ protocol with authentication is needed.
I. INTRODUCTION
A very simple model that is well suited to represent physical
layer security schemes is the wire-tap channel [1], in which
a transmitter (Alice) sends information to the legitimate re-
ceiver (Bob), but this is also received by the eavesdropper
(Eve). Alice can adopt whatever randomization, encoding and
modulation scheme before transmitting her message, and both
Bob and Eve are perfectly aware of the transmission technique
she uses; so, at least in principle, they are both able to recover
the 1× k message vector (u) from the 1×n codeword vector
(c). However, the channel that separates Alice from Bob is
generally different from that between Alice and Eve. For this
reason, the codeword received by Bob (cB) is not equal to
that gathered by Eve (cE). So, after inverting the encoding
map, the message obtained by Bob (uB) can differ from that
recovered by Eve (uE).
Under an information theoretic viewpoint, the wire-tap
channel can be described through the secrecy capacity, defined
as the highest transmission rate at which Bob can achieve
arbitrarily small error probability while Eve has no information
on the transmitted message. In this study, we are interested in
the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) wire-tap channel,
for which the secrecy capacity equals the difference between
the two channel capacities [2]. So, transmission security can
be achieved only on condition that Bob’s AWGN channel
has higher signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) with respect to Eve’s
AWGN channel. On the other hand, in [3] it was shown that
physical layer security is attainable even when Bob’s SNR
is lower than Eve’s SNR, but this requires the presence of a
feedback channel between Alice and Bob (also accessible to
Eve). In this paper, we consider Automatic Repeat reQuest
(ARQ) protocols [4], that exploit a very simple feedback
mechanism, based on checking the integrity of all frames and
sending acknowledgment (or non-acknowledgment) messages
from the receiver back to the transmitter.
The concept of secrecy capacity is based on limit values,
and can be seen as a bound when using real transmission
techniques. On the other hand, in real cases, it is interesting
to estimate the channel degradation that is needed to reach a
fixed level of physical layer security, though not achieving the
secrecy capacity. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity assumes
that both receivers use optimal decoders. Under a crypto-
graphic viewpoint, the assumption of providing an attacker
with an optimal decoder would also be useful for estimating
the minimum security level of the system. However, this is not
necessary with the aim to make a comparison among different
transmission techniques. For this purpose, it is meaningful
to suppose that both Bob and Eve use the same decoding
technique. If Eve would adopt a more efficient decoder, we
can expect that the conclusion of the comparative analysis
among different techniques does not change.
Based on these premises, our analysis is focused on a
parameter named security gap, that expresses the quality
difference between Bob’s and Eve’s channels that is required
to achieve a sufficient level of physical layer security when
both them implement the same receiver. An important target
is to keep the security gap as small as possible, in such a way
as to achieve high physical layer security even with a small
degradation of Eve’s channel with respect to Bob’s one.
Some previous works have been devoted to the study of
what transmission techniques are best suited to reduce the
security gap. In particular, in [5], the authors propose the
usage of punctured codes, by associating the secret bits to
punctured bits. They consider punctured LDPC codes and
prove that such technique, for a fixed rate, is able to guarantee
a considerable reduction in the security gap with respect to
non-punctured (systematic) transmission. Recently, we have
proposed an alternative solution, based on non-systematic
coding implemented through scrambling of the information
bits [6]. Such kind of coded transmission is able to achieve a
strong reduction in the security gap, that becomes comparable
(and even better) than that obtained through puncturing.
In this paper, we consider different coded transmission
techniques over the AWGN channel with Binary Phase Shift
Keying (BPSK) and investigate how the security gap can be
reduced by introducing concatenation within scrambling. In
this case, the information frames are grouped into blocks
and scrambled/descrambled together, so increasing the error
propagation effect for the unauthorized receiver. As a further
contribution, we show that, when there is no gap between
Bob’s and Eve’s channels, security can still be achieved by
resorting to an ARQ protocol with authentication by Bob. In
such case, only Bob can request for retransmission of a frame,
that, however, is also received by Eve.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we remind
the main concepts and definitions of scrambled codes for the
wire-tap channel; in Section III we study the case of t-error
correcting codes under hard-decision decoding; in Section
IV we consider LDPC codes as an example of codes with
soft-decision decoding; in Section V we describe the system
adopting scrambled codes together with ARQ; finally, Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. SCRAMBLED CODES FOR THE WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
Given the k × n generator matrix of an (n, k)-linear block
code in systematic form G = [I|C], and a non-singular k× k
binary scrambling matrix S, Alice performs encoding as c =
u · S ·G, that is, by replacing the information vector u with
its scrambled version u′ = u · S before applying the code.
If Bob’s channel quality is sufficiently high, Bob has a high
probability to correct all errors, thus recovering, after descram-
bling, uB = u = cl · S−1, where cl is the vector containing
the first k bits of c. On the other hand, at the output of the
descrambler, Eve has uE = u+ el · S−1, where el is the left
part of Eve’s residual error vector e = [el|er]. So, if matrix S
is suitably chosen, descrambling has the effect of propagating
the residual errors after decoding. A sufficient level of security
is achieved when Bob’s and Eve’s energy per bit to noise
power spectral density ratios (denoted by EbN0
∣∣∣
B
and EbN0
∣∣∣
E
,
respectively) are such that Bob’s bit error probability is lower
than a given threshold, PBe ≤ PBe
(
Eb
N0
∣∣∣
B
)
, while Eve’s one is
greater than another threshold, 0.5 ≥ PEe ≥ PEe
(
Eb
N0
∣∣∣
E
)
. The
security gap is then defined, in dB, as Sg = EbN0
∣∣∣
B
− EbN0
∣∣∣
E
.
We obtain a first estimate of the scrambling effect by
studying an ideal case we denote as perfect scrambling: it
models a scrambling technique that, in presence of one (or
more) error(s), produces maximum uncertainty. Under the
hypothesis of perfect scrambling, a single residual bit error
in the decoded word is sufficient to ensure that half of the bits
are in error after descrambling. In practice, perfect scrambling
can always be approached by using S matrices with dense
inverse (S−1), that is, with a density of 1 symbols next to 0.5.
The propagation effect of scrambling matrices on residual
errors can be further increased by implementing the scram-
bling and descrambling operations on blocks of frames, rather
than on single frames. Let us suppose to collect L consecutive
information frames in a vector u = [u1|u2| . . . |uL]. Scram-
bling can be directly applied on the whole L-frame block as:
u′ = u · S, (1)
where u′ is the scrambled version of the L-frame block
and S is a scrambling matrix with size kL × kL. After
block scrambling, vector u′ is divided into its components
[u′1|u
′
2| . . . |u
′
L], that are encoded and transmitted separately,
as in the case without block scrambling. Both Bob and Eve
must collect their received frames into blocks of L frames
before applying the block descrambling matrix S−1. After
descrambling, Eve gets a block of L information frames
uE = u+ el · S
−1
, where el is the concatenation of the error
vectors affecting the L information frames.
It is evident that, by using descrambling on blocks of
frames, its error propagation effect increases, since a single
residual bit error in one of the L frames can be spread into
all of them. We extend the concept of perfect scrambling
by defining that, under the hypothesis of a perfect block
scrambler, a single bit error in one of the L frames ensures
that, after descrambling: i) all the L frames are in error and
ii) half of the bits in each frame are erred. We will see in
the following that the condition of perfect scrambling can be
approached, even in such case, for practical choices of the
system parameters.
III. t-ERROR CORRECTING CODING
Let us consider a hard-decision decoded (n, k) linear block
code able to correct t bit errors. When such a coding scheme is
adopted, the frame error probability, under bounded-distance
decoding, can be estimated as Pf =
∑n
i=t+1
(
n
i
)
P i0(1 −
P0)
n−i
, where P0 is the channel bit error probability taking
into account the bandwidth expansion due to the code, i.e.,
P0 = 1/2 · erfc
(√
Eb/N0 · k/n
)
.
When scrambling is performed over single frames, the
frame error probability is the same as for the unscrambled
transmission; so, in presence of perfect scrambling, the bit
error probability after descrambling is:
PPSe =
1
2
Pf =
1
2
n∑
i=t+1
(
n
i
)
P i0(1− P0)
n−i. (2)
In order to remove the hypothesis of perfect scrambling, we
consider a real descrambling matrix S−1 with column weight
w ≤ k and denote: by Pj the probability that a received k-
bit vector contains j errors before descrambling; by Pi|j the
probability that exactly i out of j errors are selected by a
weight w column of S−1. Under such assumptions, the bit
error probability on each received bit, after descrambling, can
be calculated as follows:
PSe =
k∑
j=0
Pj
min(j,w)∑
i=1
i odd
Pi|j . (3)
In (3), Pj =
(
k
j
)∑n
i=t+1
(
n−k
i−j
)
P i0 (1− P0)
n−i
and Pi|j =(
j
i
)(
k−j
w−i
)
/
(
k
w
)
. We have observed in [6] that a density w/k ≈
0.01 is enough to approach the effect of perfect scrambling.
When scrambling is applied on blocks of L concatenated
frames, its effect can still be evaluated by considering the
perfect scrambling model. In this case, the frame and bit
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Fig. 1. Eve’s bit error probability versus the security gap for PB
e
= 10−5,
when using the (2047, 1354, 69) BCH code with concatenated scrambling.
error probability after descrambling can be easily estimated
as follows: {
PL-PSf = 1− (1− Pf )
L ,
PL-PSe =
1
2P
L-PS
f .
(4)
When real block scrambling matrices are instead adopted,
the bit error probability after block descrambling can be esti-
mated starting from the bit error probability with single frame
descrambling, given by (3). Let us consider, for simplicity,
that the kL× kL block descrambling matrix has constant row
and column weight wL, and it is formed by L × L square
blocks with size k × k and row/column weight w. Under
such assumption, each received bit after block descrambling
can be seen as the sum of L received bits after single frame
descrambling; so, its error probability can be estimated as:
PL-Se =
L∑
i=1
i odd
(
L
i
)(
PSe
)i (
1− PSe
)L−i
. (5)
In order to evaluate the effect of concatenated scrambling
on the security gap, we have considered a (n = 2047, k =
1354, t = 69) BCH code and PBe = 10−5. Fig. 1 shows
the values of PEe , as a function of the security gap, when
scrambling is performed over blocks of concatenated frames
with different size (L). As we observe from the figure, the
introduction of concatenated scrambling reduces the security
gap needed to reach high values of PEe with respect to the
case without concatenation (L = 1). We also observe that the
effect of a block descrambling matrix with row and column
weight wL = 20L, for L > 2, approaches that of the
corresponding perfect scrambler. The convergence to perfect
scrambling would also improve by increasing w.
IV. NON-SYSTEMATIC LDPC CODES
As an example of Soft-In Soft-Out modern error correcting
schemes, we consider LDPC codes, to which we apply the
approach of non-systematic transmission based on scrambling.
We consider an LDPC code with length n = 2364 and dimen-
sion k = 1576, designed through the well-known Progressive
Edge Growth (PEG) algorithm [7].
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Fig. 2. Eve’s bit error probability versus the security gap for PB
e
= 10−5 ,
when using a (2364, 1576) LDPC code with concatenated scrambling.
In the case of scrambling performed over single frames,
non-systematic LDPC coded transmission has been obtained
by adopting a dense 1576 × 1576 scrambling matrix, and
we have verified it practically reaches the effect of a perfect
scrambler. Also in this case, the security gap can be reduced
by resorting to concatenated scrambling. Starting from the Pf
values for the case with single frame scrambling, the effect of
a perfect scrambler on blocks of L concatenated frames can
be estimated by means of Eqs. (4). Fig. 2 shows the values
of PEe versus the security gap for PBe = 10−5 and different
values of L. We have verified through numerical simulations
that, by using real scrambling matrices with a high density
of 1 symbols in their inverse, the effect of block scrambling
is almost coincident with that predicted through the perfect
scrambler approximation.
V. CODED TRANSMISSION WITH ARQ
Coded transmission based on scrambling is able to strongly
reduce the security gap with respect to systematic transmission
[6]. However, physical layer security is still achievable only
when Bob has a better channel than Eve. It is known from the
literature that, when Bob’s and Eve’s channels have the same
quality, or Eve’s channel is even better than Bob’s, a feedback
mechanism is needed to achieve security [8], [9].
We investigate such case by considering a very common
feedback mechanism, based on integrity checks and ARQ.
Obviously, the request for retransmissions must be allowed for
Bob only; so, this setting requires the existence of a form of
authentication between Alice and Bob. However, retransmitted
packets are also available to Eve, through her channel.
Physical layer security on channels with ARQ has been
already studied and it has been shown that a scheme based
on ARQ can recover security of the wired equivalent privacy
(WEP) protocol for wireless local area networks, otherwise
vulnerable to total break attacks [10]. ARQ has also been
recently used together with puncturing for physical layer secu-
rity: in [9], the authors propose a scheme for using puncturing
and ARQ on the wire-tap channel with packet erasures in such
a way that the loss of a single packet is sufficient to prevent
the eavesdropper from decoding the message.
In this paper, we use ARQ together with Forward Error
Correcting (FEC) codes, so we consider Hybrid ARQ (HARQ)
schemes. Several implementations are possible for HARQ
schemes: two main families are those using incremental re-
dundancy [11] and soft-combining [12]; both of them have
been implemented in a number of variants. When soft-decision
maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) decoding algorithms
are adopted, a common approach consists in using the relia-
bility values obtained after each (failed) decoding attempt as a
priori values for decoding the next replica of the same frame.
Other variants (as that proposed in [12]) of such approach can
be conceived that are able to improve the performance.
However, this soft-combining strategy is only applicable
with soft-decision decoding, while we are interested in eval-
uating the performance of HARQ systems in less restrictive
conditions. For this reason, we consider a HARQ scheme that
exploits the simplest form of soft-combining: it consists in
averaging the channel outputs, after multiple transmissions of
the same frame. Such scheme is a valuable benchmark, since
it can be implemented with whatever family of codes (ex-
ploiting both hard and soft-decision decoding). More complex
strategies of soft-combining could provide some improvement
in performance, especially when the maximum number of
allowed retransmissions is high (that is not the situation
considered in this paper). In that case, Eve could get some
advantage from adopting such more involved approaches. This
will be the object of future work.
In the HARQ protocol we consider, Bob can exploit a
number of transmissions Q ≤ Qmax for decoding each frame
and Eve receives all retransmissions requested by Bob. It
should be noted that the integrity check mechanism, based
on parity-checks, is exposed to undetected errors, that is,
transitions of the received codeword to near codewords. In this
case, integrity of the frame is erroneously verified. However,
for long codes with rather high rate and error correction
capability, undetected errors are extremely rare (as we have
verified in our simulations).
According with the description above, a first solution is to
try decoding only on the average of the Q received replicas
of each frame. A more “aggressive” approach (that could be
adopted by Eve) is to try all possible averages of the Q
received replicas of each frame. In this case, a further im-
provement in performance can be achieved (though at the cost
of increased complexity). In general terms, starting from the
curve of Pf (Eb/N0) for the considered transmission scheme,
the frame error probability when decoding is performed on
the average of Q ≤ Qmax independent transmissions can
be modeled through an AWGN channel with noise variance
divided by Q; so, it becomes:
P
(Q)
f (Eb/N0) = Pf (Eb/N0 ·Q) . (6)
In classical ARQ schemes, the frame error probability at
each transmission of a given frame is independent of the
others; so, the frame error probability after Q transmissions is
simply the product of the Q frame error probabilities at each
transmission. When using soft-combining, such hypothesis is
no longer valid. For example, in the soft-combining strategy
we adopt, since the second transmission of a frame is requested
only upon a decoding failure on the first transmission, the
decision variable is no longer Gaussian and (6) should be
modified. However, as we have verified through simulations,
the impact of such correction is negligible, at least for our
choice of the system parameters; so, we adopt P (Q)f , expressed
by (6), as an estimate of the frame error probability at the Q-th
transmission of the considered HARQ protocol.
In the system model we adopt, Bob is always able to request
retransmission of a frame, when needed (i.e., after a decoding
failure); so, the probability that he receives Q ≥ 1 transmis-
sions of a frame coincides with his frame error probability
after Q− 1 transmissions, that is:
P
(Q)
R
∣∣∣
B
=
Q−1∏
i=0
P
(i)
f , (7)
with P (0)f = 1. On the contrary, when Eve, after a decoding
failure, would need a frame retransmission, she is able to
receive it only on condition that Bob has failed to decode
the same frame. Then, the probability that she receives Q ≥ 1
(useful) transmissions of a frame is:
P
(Q)
R
∣∣∣
E
=
Q−1∏
i=0
[
P
(i)
f
]2
. (8)
Based on (7) and (8), Bob’s and Eve’s frame error probability
is:
P
B/E
f
∣∣∣
ARQ
= 1−
Qmax∑
i=1
P
(i)
R
∣∣∣
B/E
·
(
1− P
(i)
f
)
. (9)
In the following subsection, we present some results on the
usage of the HARQ scheme, here described, with the t-error
correcting codes and LDPC codes considered in the previous
sections.
A. ARQ with t-Error Correcting codes
Fig. 3 shows the frame error probability curves, for the
(2047, 1354, 69) BCH code, obtained through (9) and by
numerical simulations. The maximum number of transmissions
has been set Qmax = 2. As we observe from the figure, the
analytical model fits very well the simulated data. From the
frame error probability curves we can deduce the bit error
probability performance in presence of scrambling, by using
the simplifying hypothesis of perfect scrambling.
From the figure we notice that Bob’s and Eve’s performance
can be divided into three regions of SNR values:
i) At low SNRs, Bob’s channel quality is poor (PBf = 1).
In this region, Bob requests retransmission of all frames,
and Eve can benefit from this fact. So, Eve’s perfor-
mance is overlaid with Bob’s one, and their error proba-
bility curves have a gain of 3 dB (due to Q = Qmax = 2)
with respect to the case without ARQ, as expected.
ii) When the channel quality is high enough that Bob
requests few retransmissions (PBf < 1), Eve misses most
0 1 2 3 4 5
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Fr
am
e 
Er
ro
r 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Eb/N0 [dB]
 no ARQ
 Bob
 Eve (theor.)
 Eve (sim.)
Fig. 3. Frame Error Probability versus SNR for the (2047, 1354, 69) BCH
code with soft-combining HARQ (Qmax = 2).
of the retransmissions she would need. Moreover, the
channel quality is still not sufficient to allow correct
decoding without ARQ, so her performance deteriorates.
Bob’s error probability curve continues to decrease
towards very small values, while Eve’s one grows.
iii) For large SNR values, the channel quality becomes
adequate to allow decoding with a single transmission
of each frame, and Eve’s performance tends to that of
the system without ARQ.
An important observation (that also justifies the interest for
the frame error probability, in place of the bit error probability,
as in the previous figures) is that, without resorting to concate-
nated scrambling, HARQ is not able to achieve a sufficient
level of physical layer security. In fact, in the region where
Bob achieves low frame error probabilities, Eve’s frame error
probability is always too low to guarantee security. However,
by using concatenated scrambling, the security condition can
be recovered.
For example, by means of Eqs. (4), we can easily estimate
that, by using a concatenated scrambler with L = 20, the
region of PEf ≥ 10−1 (around 4 dB) translates into PEf > 0.87.
In the same region, Bob’s frame error probability is surely
PBf < 10
−6
, and it becomes PBf < 2 · 10−5 after the ap-
plication of the concatenated scrambler. So, under the perfect
scrambler assumption, it is PEe > 0.4 and PBe < 1 ·10−5, that
restores the desired security level.
B. ARQ with LDPC codes
A very similar situation is observed for ARQ with LDPC
codes, whose frame error probability curves have been es-
timated through numerical simulations and are reported in
Fig. 4. From the figure we notice that Bob’s and Eve’s error
probability curves have the same three-zone behavior observed
for hard-decision decoded BCH codes.
Also in this case, we observe the presence of a region
(around 1.8 dB) where Eve’s frame error probability is ≥ 10−1
while Bob’s one (according to the trend of the simulated curve)
will become < 10−6; so, the application of a concatenated
scrambler with L = 20 still allows to achieve the desired
physical layer security.
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Fig. 4. Frame Error Probability versus SNR for the (2364, 1576) LDPC
code with soft-combining HARQ (Qmax = 2).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have continued the study of codes with scrambling
for physical layer security over the AWGN wire-tap channel.
Our results show that the implementation of scrambling and
descrambling on blocks of concatenated frames, rather than
on single frames, can further reduce the security gap.
By using concatenated scrambling in conjunction with a
HARQ protocol with soft-combining, a sufficient level of
physical layer security can also be ensured when Bob’s and
Eve’s channels have the same quality. The same target could
be reached even when Eve has a better channel than Bob; this
aspect will be investigated in future works.
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